J-Dawgs Industries · Proof Page
Proof of work: the shipped product, run end to end — hits and misses published.
On November 16, 2026, we took the exact file a buyer receives —
q-day-ledger-v1.zip (Q-Day Ledger™ v1.0.1, 112,741 bytes,
SHA-256 57042e1bb13895e15b24b5b684227da05dfc3e663704bed7b40d00c9b74933c9) —
extracted it fresh, and ran it the way the included Quickstart tells a buyer to run it.
Nothing was installed: the product is pure Python 3 standard library, zero dependencies.
The run machine used Python 3.12.3.
Seal check: sha256sum -c MANIFEST.sha256 → 50 of 50 files OK.
Included test suite: python3 -m unittest discover -s tests → 26 of 26 tests pass.
Demo run: ./demo.sh → exit code 0, full pipeline in about 2.5 seconds.
The target is the package's bundled sample target — a synthetic fixture tree (openssl-generated certificates and keys, planted source-code patterns, a sample SBOM) built to exercise all four scanners. This is a real run of the shipped code on a demonstration target. It is not a real company's inventory, and no number on this page comes from a customer.
Nearest governing deadline found: 2030-12-31. Planning-estimate effort for the full migration: 231 engineer-days (the plan labels these as planning estimates, not quotes). The run wrote all five promised outputs:
cbom.cdx.json (58,323 bytes): valid CycloneDX specVersion 1.6,
37 components, every one typed cryptographic-asset with full
cryptoProperties and per-asset location, scanner, and risk-score properties.
Download this run's actual CBOM and open it in any CycloneDX tool.qday-store.json, the database the other outputs were built from.Every asset the demo found, with its score (0–100), harvest-now-decrypt-later (HNDL) class, mandated replacement, and deadline — exactly as the migration plan printed it.
| Asset | Algorithm | Location | Risk | HNDL | Replacement | Mandate | Deadline |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Signature container firmware-v3.p7s | RSA | firmware/firmware-v3.p7s | 100 CRITICAL | HIGH | ML-KEM-768 / ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 203/204) | CNSA2-SIGNING | 2030-12-31 |
| Certificate legacy.example.internal | RSA | certs/server-rsa.pem | 91 CRITICAL | HIGH | ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) | CNSA2-SIGNING | 2030-12-31 |
| Certificate ec.example.internal | ECDSA | certs/server-ec.pem | 86 CRITICAL | HIGH | ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) | CNSA2-SIGNING | 2030-12-31 |
| Certificate Sample Root CA | RSA | certs/root-ca.der | 86 CRITICAL | HIGH | ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) | CNSA2-SIGNING | 2030-12-31 |
| RSA in source | RSA | src/Service.java:12 | 85 CRITICAL | LOW | ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) | CNSA2-SIGNING | 2030-12-31 |
| RSA in source | RSA | src/web.js:9 | 80 CRITICAL | LOW | ML-KEM-768 (FIPS 203) | IR8547-DEPRECATE | 2030-12-31 |
| DES in source | DES | src/Service.java:16 | 75 CRITICAL | LOW | AES-256-GCM | IR8547-DEPRECATE | 2030-12-31 |
| SBOM crypto asset | RSA | sbom/bom.cdx.json | 75 CRITICAL | LOW | ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) | CNSA2-SIGNING | 2030-12-31 |
| RSA in source | RSA | src/app.py:18 | 75 CRITICAL | LOW | ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) | CNSA2-SIGNING | 2030-12-31 |
| RSA in source | RSA | src/main.go:14 | 75 CRITICAL | LOW | ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) | CNSA2-SIGNING | 2030-12-31 |
| RSA in source | RSA | src/Service.java:11 | 72 HIGH | LOW | ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) | CNSA2-SIGNING | 2030-12-31 |
| RSA in source | RSA | src/app.py:5 | 72 HIGH | LOW | ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) | CNSA2-SIGNING | 2030-12-31 |
| RSA in source | RSA | src/web.js:6 | 72 HIGH | LOW | ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) | CNSA2-SIGNING | 2030-12-31 |
| ECDH in source | ECDH | src/Service.java:19 | 70 HIGH | LOW | ML-KEM-768 (FIPS 203), hybrid X25519+ML-KEM-768 in transition | CNSA2-NETWORKING | 2030-12-31 |
| Library ecdsa@0.19.0 | ECDSA | requirements.txt | 70 HIGH | LOW | ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204); SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) for long-lived roots | CNSA2-SIGNING | 2030-12-31 |
| ECDSA in source | ECDSA | src/main.go:15 | 70 HIGH | LOW | ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204); SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) for long-lived roots | CNSA2-SIGNING | 2030-12-31 |
| ECDSA in source | ECDSA | src/web.js:8 | 70 HIGH | LOW | ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204); SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) for long-lived roots | CNSA2-SIGNING | 2030-12-31 |
| Library jsencrypt@^3.3.2 | RSA | package.json | 70 HIGH | LOW | ML-KEM-768 (FIPS 203) | IR8547-DEPRECATE | 2030-12-31 |
| DES in source | DES | src/app.py:20 | 65 HIGH | LOW | AES-256-GCM | IR8547-DEPRECATE | 2030-12-31 |
| MD5 in source | MD5 | src/Service.java:7 | 55 HIGH | LOW | SHA-384 or SHA-512 (FIPS 180-4); SHA-3 where required | IR8547-DEPRECATE | 2030-12-31 |
| MD5 in source | MD5 | src/app.py:10 | 55 HIGH | LOW | SHA-384 or SHA-512 (FIPS 180-4); SHA-3 where required | IR8547-DEPRECATE | 2030-12-31 |
| MD5 in source | MD5 | src/main.go:7 | 55 HIGH | LOW | SHA-384 or SHA-512 (FIPS 180-4); SHA-3 where required | IR8547-DEPRECATE | 2030-12-31 |
| SHA-1 in source | SHA-1 | src/app.py:13 | 55 HIGH | LOW | SHA-384 or SHA-512 (FIPS 180-4) | IR8547-DEPRECATE | 2030-12-31 |
| SHA-1 in source | SHA-1 | src/web.js:5 | 55 HIGH | LOW | SHA-384 or SHA-512 (FIPS 180-4) | IR8547-DEPRECATE | 2030-12-31 |
| Firmware image bootloader.bin | UNKNOWN | firmware/bootloader.bin | 48 MEDIUM | LOW | Identify the algorithm, then re-score | — | — |
| Firmware image firmware-v3.bin | UNKNOWN | firmware/firmware-v3.bin | 48 MEDIUM | LOW | Identify the algorithm, then re-score | — | — |
| Unidentified crypto in source | UNKNOWN | src/app.py:23 | 43 MEDIUM | LOW | Identify the algorithm, then re-score | — | — |
| Private key (type/size only) | UNKNOWN | keys/root-ca.key | 35 MEDIUM | LOW | Identify the algorithm, then re-score | — | — |
| Private key (type/size only) | UNKNOWN | keys/server-ec.key | 35 MEDIUM | LOW | Identify the algorithm, then re-score | — | — |
| Private key (type/size only) | UNKNOWN | keys/server-rsa.key | 35 MEDIUM | LOW | Identify the algorithm, then re-score | — | — |
| Library crypto-js@^4.2.0 | UNKNOWN | package.json | 35 MEDIUM | LOW | Identify the algorithm, then re-score | — | — |
| Library pycrypto@2.6.1 | UNKNOWN | requirements.txt | 35 MEDIUM | LOW | Identify the algorithm, then re-score | — | — |
| Library openssl@1.1.1w (from SBOM) | UNKNOWN | sbom/bom.cdx.json | 35 MEDIUM | LOW | Identify the algorithm, then re-score | — | — |
| AES-128 in source | AES-128 | src/app.py:21 | 30 MEDIUM | LOW | AES-256 (CNSA 2.0 symmetric baseline) | IR8547-DEPRECATE | 2030-12-31 |
| AES-128 in source | AES-128 | src/web.js:7 | 30 MEDIUM | LOW | AES-256 (CNSA 2.0 symmetric baseline) | IR8547-DEPRECATE | 2030-12-31 |
| AES (mode unspecified) in source | AES | src/app.py:19 | 30 MEDIUM | LOW | AES-256 | — | — |
| SHA-256 in source | SHA-256 | src/app.py:16 | 15 LOW | LOW | SHA-384 preferred for new designs (FIPS 180-4) | — | — |
The plan file itself — linked above — is the unedited output of this run; compare any row.
The demo exercises the source, certificate, and dependency scanners. To prove the fourth
scanner — the live TLS prober — we pointed it at a live TLS endpoint we control
(a local openssl s_server presenting a fresh self-signed RSA-2048 certificate).
It found 2 assets, both scored CRITICAL, and reported the endpoint correctly:
TLS key establishment — ECDH, score 78: "negotiated TLSv1.3 /
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256-bit bulk); versions accepted: TLSv1.2, TLSv1.3" — both correct.
Certificate — RSA 2048-bit, score 87: signature algorithm sha256WithRSAEncryption and
the certificate's validity dates parsed correctly from the DER.
9 of the 37 assets came back "UNKNOWN — identify the algorithm, then re-score." The tool flags what it cannot identify instead of guessing. In this run that was: 2 opaque firmware images (it reports signed vs. unsigned but does not identify the algorithm inside an opaque binary), 3 private keys (inventoried by type and size only — key material is never read beyond the header, by design), 3 libraries whose cryptography cannot be determined from a manifest alone (crypto-js, pycrypto, and the sample SBOM's OpenSSL 1.1.1w entry), and 1 unidentified source pattern.
Our first public-internet TLS probe failed. Probing jdawgsindustries.com:443 from our test sandbox returned a non-TLS response (SSL "wrong version number") — the sandbox's network path, not the endpoint. The tool recorded the failure as an asset — "TLS endpoint unreachable," with the probe error as its evidence — instead of silently passing. The controlled local-endpoint run above is the TLS scanner's verified behavior.
Phase 3 of the sample plan (the 2031 signature wave) is empty. Correct for this target — no sample asset lands there — and shown as-is rather than padded.
Stated limits of the product itself: the source scanner covers Python, JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Go, C/C++, and configuration files — other languages are not scanned. The TLS prober sees only endpoints reachable from where it runs. Source and dependency scans list assets in filesystem-walk order (a documented v1.1 cleanup item; scores and deadlines do not depend on listing order). Engineer-day figures are planning estimates. Mandate rules are data files in the package — when a mandate changes, the rules update by editing JSON, and the dates on this page are the ones the shipped v1.0.1 rules carry.
The cheapest verification is your own hands. The sales page offers the free sample CBOM pack and a free external TLS scan of your company's public endpoints — run by this same prober, reported against the 2030/2035 deadlines, no obligation. If you buy, the Fix-It Guarantee applies: any problem you report gets fixed, and v1.0.0 buyers already received v1.0.1 free under it.
Single-Organization — $1,499 one-time Full product page & all editions