J-Dawgs Industries · Proof Page

Q-Day Ledger™

Proof of work: the shipped product, run end to end — hits and misses published.

No fancy logos. Just quality products. No ads. We never sell your information.

What was run, and when

On November 16, 2026, we took the exact file a buyer receives — q-day-ledger-v1.zip (Q-Day Ledger™ v1.0.1, 112,741 bytes, SHA-256 57042e1bb13895e15b24b5b684227da05dfc3e663704bed7b40d00c9b74933c9) — extracted it fresh, and ran it the way the included Quickstart tells a buyer to run it. Nothing was installed: the product is pure Python 3 standard library, zero dependencies. The run machine used Python 3.12.3.

Seal check: sha256sum -c MANIFEST.sha256 → 50 of 50 files OK.
Included test suite: python3 -m unittest discover -s tests → 26 of 26 tests pass.
Demo run: ./demo.sh → exit code 0, full pipeline in about 2.5 seconds.

The target is the package's bundled sample target — a synthetic fixture tree (openssl-generated certificates and keys, planted source-code patterns, a sample SBOM) built to exercise all four scanners. This is a real run of the shipped code on a demonstration target. It is not a real company's inventory, and no number on this page comes from a customer.

What the run produced

37
cryptographic assets inventoried
10
CRITICAL
14
HIGH
12
MEDIUM
1
LOW
4
harvest-now HIGH exposure

Nearest governing deadline found: 2030-12-31. Planning-estimate effort for the full migration: 231 engineer-days (the plan labels these as planning estimates, not quotes). The run wrote all five promised outputs:

The full inventory from this run

Every asset the demo found, with its score (0–100), harvest-now-decrypt-later (HNDL) class, mandated replacement, and deadline — exactly as the migration plan printed it.

AssetAlgorithmLocationRiskHNDLReplacementMandateDeadline
Signature container firmware-v3.p7sRSAfirmware/firmware-v3.p7s100 CRITICALHIGHML-KEM-768 / ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 203/204)CNSA2-SIGNING2030-12-31
Certificate legacy.example.internalRSAcerts/server-rsa.pem91 CRITICALHIGHML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204)CNSA2-SIGNING2030-12-31
Certificate ec.example.internalECDSAcerts/server-ec.pem86 CRITICALHIGHML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204)CNSA2-SIGNING2030-12-31
Certificate Sample Root CARSAcerts/root-ca.der86 CRITICALHIGHML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204)CNSA2-SIGNING2030-12-31
RSA in sourceRSAsrc/Service.java:1285 CRITICALLOWML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204)CNSA2-SIGNING2030-12-31
RSA in sourceRSAsrc/web.js:980 CRITICALLOWML-KEM-768 (FIPS 203)IR8547-DEPRECATE2030-12-31
DES in sourceDESsrc/Service.java:1675 CRITICALLOWAES-256-GCMIR8547-DEPRECATE2030-12-31
SBOM crypto assetRSAsbom/bom.cdx.json75 CRITICALLOWML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204)CNSA2-SIGNING2030-12-31
RSA in sourceRSAsrc/app.py:1875 CRITICALLOWML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204)CNSA2-SIGNING2030-12-31
RSA in sourceRSAsrc/main.go:1475 CRITICALLOWML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204)CNSA2-SIGNING2030-12-31
RSA in sourceRSAsrc/Service.java:1172 HIGHLOWML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204)CNSA2-SIGNING2030-12-31
RSA in sourceRSAsrc/app.py:572 HIGHLOWML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204)CNSA2-SIGNING2030-12-31
RSA in sourceRSAsrc/web.js:672 HIGHLOWML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204)CNSA2-SIGNING2030-12-31
ECDH in sourceECDHsrc/Service.java:1970 HIGHLOWML-KEM-768 (FIPS 203), hybrid X25519+ML-KEM-768 in transitionCNSA2-NETWORKING2030-12-31
Library ecdsa@0.19.0ECDSArequirements.txt70 HIGHLOWML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204); SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) for long-lived rootsCNSA2-SIGNING2030-12-31
ECDSA in sourceECDSAsrc/main.go:1570 HIGHLOWML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204); SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) for long-lived rootsCNSA2-SIGNING2030-12-31
ECDSA in sourceECDSAsrc/web.js:870 HIGHLOWML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204); SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) for long-lived rootsCNSA2-SIGNING2030-12-31
Library jsencrypt@^3.3.2RSApackage.json70 HIGHLOWML-KEM-768 (FIPS 203)IR8547-DEPRECATE2030-12-31
DES in sourceDESsrc/app.py:2065 HIGHLOWAES-256-GCMIR8547-DEPRECATE2030-12-31
MD5 in sourceMD5src/Service.java:755 HIGHLOWSHA-384 or SHA-512 (FIPS 180-4); SHA-3 where requiredIR8547-DEPRECATE2030-12-31
MD5 in sourceMD5src/app.py:1055 HIGHLOWSHA-384 or SHA-512 (FIPS 180-4); SHA-3 where requiredIR8547-DEPRECATE2030-12-31
MD5 in sourceMD5src/main.go:755 HIGHLOWSHA-384 or SHA-512 (FIPS 180-4); SHA-3 where requiredIR8547-DEPRECATE2030-12-31
SHA-1 in sourceSHA-1src/app.py:1355 HIGHLOWSHA-384 or SHA-512 (FIPS 180-4)IR8547-DEPRECATE2030-12-31
SHA-1 in sourceSHA-1src/web.js:555 HIGHLOWSHA-384 or SHA-512 (FIPS 180-4)IR8547-DEPRECATE2030-12-31
Firmware image bootloader.binUNKNOWNfirmware/bootloader.bin48 MEDIUMLOWIdentify the algorithm, then re-score——
Firmware image firmware-v3.binUNKNOWNfirmware/firmware-v3.bin48 MEDIUMLOWIdentify the algorithm, then re-score——
Unidentified crypto in sourceUNKNOWNsrc/app.py:2343 MEDIUMLOWIdentify the algorithm, then re-score——
Private key (type/size only)UNKNOWNkeys/root-ca.key35 MEDIUMLOWIdentify the algorithm, then re-score——
Private key (type/size only)UNKNOWNkeys/server-ec.key35 MEDIUMLOWIdentify the algorithm, then re-score——
Private key (type/size only)UNKNOWNkeys/server-rsa.key35 MEDIUMLOWIdentify the algorithm, then re-score——
Library crypto-js@^4.2.0UNKNOWNpackage.json35 MEDIUMLOWIdentify the algorithm, then re-score——
Library pycrypto@2.6.1UNKNOWNrequirements.txt35 MEDIUMLOWIdentify the algorithm, then re-score——
Library openssl@1.1.1w (from SBOM)UNKNOWNsbom/bom.cdx.json35 MEDIUMLOWIdentify the algorithm, then re-score——
AES-128 in sourceAES-128src/app.py:2130 MEDIUMLOWAES-256 (CNSA 2.0 symmetric baseline)IR8547-DEPRECATE2030-12-31
AES-128 in sourceAES-128src/web.js:730 MEDIUMLOWAES-256 (CNSA 2.0 symmetric baseline)IR8547-DEPRECATE2030-12-31
AES (mode unspecified) in sourceAESsrc/app.py:1930 MEDIUMLOWAES-256——
SHA-256 in sourceSHA-256src/app.py:1615 LOWLOWSHA-384 preferred for new designs (FIPS 180-4)——

The plan file itself — linked above — is the unedited output of this run; compare any row.

Second run: the live TLS scanner, against a real endpoint

The demo exercises the source, certificate, and dependency scanners. To prove the fourth scanner — the live TLS prober — we pointed it at a live TLS endpoint we control (a local openssl s_server presenting a fresh self-signed RSA-2048 certificate). It found 2 assets, both scored CRITICAL, and reported the endpoint correctly:

TLS key establishment — ECDH, score 78: "negotiated TLSv1.3 / TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256-bit bulk); versions accepted: TLSv1.2, TLSv1.3" — both correct.
Certificate — RSA 2048-bit, score 87: signature algorithm sha256WithRSAEncryption and the certificate's validity dates parsed correctly from the DER.

The misses — published, not buried

9 of the 37 assets came back "UNKNOWN — identify the algorithm, then re-score." The tool flags what it cannot identify instead of guessing. In this run that was: 2 opaque firmware images (it reports signed vs. unsigned but does not identify the algorithm inside an opaque binary), 3 private keys (inventoried by type and size only — key material is never read beyond the header, by design), 3 libraries whose cryptography cannot be determined from a manifest alone (crypto-js, pycrypto, and the sample SBOM's OpenSSL 1.1.1w entry), and 1 unidentified source pattern.

Our first public-internet TLS probe failed. Probing jdawgsindustries.com:443 from our test sandbox returned a non-TLS response (SSL "wrong version number") — the sandbox's network path, not the endpoint. The tool recorded the failure as an asset — "TLS endpoint unreachable," with the probe error as its evidence — instead of silently passing. The controlled local-endpoint run above is the TLS scanner's verified behavior.

Phase 3 of the sample plan (the 2031 signature wave) is empty. Correct for this target — no sample asset lands there — and shown as-is rather than padded.

Stated limits of the product itself: the source scanner covers Python, JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Go, C/C++, and configuration files — other languages are not scanned. The TLS prober sees only endpoints reachable from where it runs. Source and dependency scans list assets in filesystem-walk order (a documented v1.1 cleanup item; scores and deadlines do not depend on listing order). Engineer-day figures are planning estimates. Mandate rules are data files in the package — when a mandate changes, the rules update by editing JSON, and the dates on this page are the ones the shipped v1.0.1 rules carry.

Check it yourself, free

The cheapest verification is your own hands. The sales page offers the free sample CBOM pack and a free external TLS scan of your company's public endpoints — run by this same prober, reported against the 2030/2035 deadlines, no obligation. If you buy, the Fix-It Guarantee applies: any problem you report gets fixed, and v1.0.0 buyers already received v1.0.1 free under it.

Single-Organization — $1,499 one-time Full product page & all editions